The State of the Housing Choice Voucher Program in Hawai‘i

Introduction

For about 2.3 million low-income households across the United States, the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program–commonly referred to as Section 8 Vouchers–provides critical rental assistance. It is the largest tenant-based rental subsidy program, and the design is remarkably simple. A participating household pays a fixed portion of its adjusted income–typically 30%–toward rent, while the government covers the difference, up to a payment standard determined by the local Public Housing Authority (PHA). This design is intended to prevent the “rent burden” that drives displacement and housing instability of subsidized families.

Nowhere is this program’s capacity tested more severely than in Hawai‘i. The state’s residents face the highest housing costs in the nation, with the median home now requiring well over what the state’s median income household can afford, placing homeownership out of reach for many households. The market is equally unforgiving to renters. With the median rent running at about $2,000 a month statewide, more than half of the state’s renters pay more than 30% of their income for housing, and about a third pay more than half (Tyndall et al., 2026).

Within this tight housing market, Hawai‘i’s voucher program acts as a critical lifeline for many. As of 2024, approximately 12,000 households–about 7% of the state’s renter households–lease their homes with a voucher. One of the biggest components of HCV is the core tenant-based voucher program, which is supported by roughly $170 million in annual federal rental assistance, providing stability for the state’s most vulnerable residents.

However, the voucher program in Hawai‘i is facing a structural crisis. Despite two decades of increased federal funding, the program’s capacity has remained stagnant. While federal expenditures have risen three-fold since 2003–about 70% in real terms–the number of households served has grown by only 20%. This disconnect exposes a fiscal trap: nearly the entire increase in federal investment has been absorbed by rising market rents, effectively subsidizing the market rather than expanding the program’s reach to families on the waiting list. The state is effectively paying more to house the same number of people, leaving thousands of eligible households without subsidies.

This fiscal strain is exacerbated by two defining demographic changes. First, the voucher population is aging. As Hawai‘i’s general population ages, so too do the program’s participants. The share of voucher households with an elderly member has more than doubled over the last two decades. While this provides essential stability for Hawai‘i’s seniors, it also creates a capacity constraint. Elderly households, who rely heavily on fixed pension incomes, participate less in the labor market and are significantly less likely to exit the program. This leads to lower turnover, which should be the primary engine providing new vouchers to other eligible families without vouchers.

Second, the program increasingly serves a population with deepening economic vulnerability. With stagnant income among voucher tenants and rapidly rising housing costs, the government’s subsidy burden for each lease has grown mechanically. This creates a “rent inflation tax”on the program: as market-side costs increase, federal dollars are mostly spent just to keep existing tenants housed, leaving fewer resources to expand the program to the thousands of eligible families waiting for assistance.

Addressing this limited financial capacity requires two strategies that move beyond simply managing the existing caseload. The first is to moderate market-wide rent growth, and one of the ways this can be achieved is to expand the supply of housing (Asquith et al., 2023; Mense, 2025). Because the voucher program relies on the private rental market, federal expenditures are inherently linked to broader market rents. When market prices rise, the government’s subsidy burden increases mechanically. Increasing the housing inventory–whether through luxury or affordable developments–can help temper this growth by triggering a “filtering” process (Fang et al., 2026; Mast, 2023). As new housing enters the market, it initiates a chain of residential moves that eventually frees up older yet more affordable housing stock for voucher holders.

The second strategy is the promotion of upward economic mobility among voucher recipients. If the program is to successfully transition from a permanent housing safety net into a bridge toward housing independence, it must find new ways to improve the earning potential of its participants. Providing targeted training and educational resources can help households increase their income, allowing them to contribute more toward their own rent and, ultimately, exit the program. By facilitating exits for those who have achieved upward mobility, the program can reclaim resources to serve new families, effectively shortening the waitlist and expanding the reach of the voucher program.

This report provides what is likely the first comprehensive analysis of the HCV program in Hawai‘i. Specifically, it focuses on the core tenant-based voucher program, which constitutes the majority of these rental subsidies, rather than project-based or special-purpose vouchers. Until now, analysis of the program was mostly limited to separate annual reports from individual Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), which made it difficult to see the full picture of how the program operated statewide over time. This research fills that gap by utilizing restricted-access, micro-level administrative data of households receiving federal rental assistance provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) through a formal data-use agreement. Where necessary, this analysis is supplemented by publicly available data which will be mentioned explicitly in the report. All other calculations are the author’s own. I hope this report serves as a vital resource for policymakers, stakeholders, and the public, offering an evidence-based roadmap toward a more stable and accessible housing future for Hawai‘i.

How the Voucher Program Works in Hawai‘i

The Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program is one of the federal government’s primary tools for providing rental assistance within the private market. Unlike public housing, the government owns no units. Instead, it provides a portable subsidy that allows low-income families to lease from private landlords. Five Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) administer the program in Hawai‘i: the four county agencies and the state-run Hawaii Public Housing Authority (HPHA).

Table 1. Voucher-administering Public Housing Authorities in Hawai‘i, 2024

How is the rent paid?

A voucher household typically pays approximately 30% of its adjusted income toward rent and utilities. The PHA administering the voucher pays the remainder—known as the Housing Assistance Payment (HAP)—directly to the landlord, up to a ceiling known as the “payment standard.” Each PHA sets its payment standard between 90% and 110% of the “Fair Market Rent” (FMR), an annual estimate calculated by HUD to reflect the cost of modest rental units in the area. A family may lease a unit renting above the payment standard and pay the difference, provided that their total contribution toward rent and utilities does not exceed 40% of their adjusted income. Crucially, this mechanism creates a direct link between housing market prices and federal spending: when rents grow faster than tenant incomes, the government’s subsidy burden increases automatically, leaving fewer resources available for the PHA to assist new households.

Who is eligible to receive a voucher?

Eligibility is set by income. A household generally qualifies if its income is at or below 50% of the area median income (AMI) for its household size. However, federal rules require that three-quarters of each year’s new vouchers go to households below 30% of AMI. Because the limits are tied to local income, they vary widely across the country. In 2024, a single person in Urban Honolulu qualified with income up to $48,750 and a family of four up to $69,600, while the extremely low-income thresholds that govern most new admissions stood at $29,250 and $41,750, respectively.

However, eligibility is not an entitlement. Unlike food assistance or Medicaid, rental assistance stops when the available number of vouchers runs out (depending on the budget). Terner Center estimates that only one in four eligible households receives a housing voucher in the United States (Economy and Finnigan, 2025). In Hawai‘i, I estimate roughly one in five. Such a gap shows the program’s constraint: the years-long waiting lists, the sporadic lottery openings, the slow turnover, and the financial constraints, all of which this report documents.

What happens once a family receives a voucher?

The process of securing housing with a voucher is often a race against time. Once a household is finally issued a voucher after years on a waiting list, they enter a narrow window—typically 60 to 120 days—to locate and lease a suitable unit in the private market. This search is not merely a matter of finding an available housing unit. It is a complex navigation through market, regulatory, and search hurdles. If a family fails to secure a lease within this timeframe, they lose their assistance and get put back on the bottom of the waitlist. These failures are not rare. Nationally, only 57% of families issued a voucher in 2022 succeeded in leasing a unit with it, down from 66% in 2018 with the typical successful search taking nearly three months (Ellen et al., 2025b). 

Securing a unit involves going through several requirements. First, a household must find a unit that falls within the program’s payment standards—a task that is understandably more difficult in an expensive housing market like Hawai‘i. Second, even if a reasonably priced unit is found, the landlord must be willing to lease to a voucher holder. This can be challenging if landlords prefer market-rate tenants or employ stringent screening practices. Such difficulties tend to be amplified in tight rental markets where landlords hold significant market power. Finally, the selected unit must pass a standard inspection to ensure it meets health and safety requirements. If a household struggles to find an affordable unit, they may be forced to search for lower-priced options, which are often in worse condition. If these lower-quality units fail the inspection, the search ultimately fails, and the household loses their opportunity to use the voucher.

Another hurdle is the search process itself. Using a voucher requires a family to understand how payment standards apply to different units, find listings, contact landlords, and explain the program to them, schedule viewings, and complete layers of paperwork–all within the deadline and largely on their own (DeLuca et al., 2023). It is possible that families with vouchers in hand can remain homeless simply because no one is available to help them through these steps, and much of today’s rental search happens online, an added obstacle for households with limited digital access. These burdens fall hardest on elderly and disabled households. An early national study found that elderly voucher recipients were less likely to successfully lease a unit than otherwise similar families (Finkel and Buron, 2001). Other research, however, shows that this barrier is fixable. In a large randomized experiment, families offered hands-on search assistance, including help understanding the program, reaching landlords, and completing applications, were dramatically more likely to lease in the neighborhoods they were seeking (Bergman et al., 2024).

For some households, the Hawaii Public Housing Authority (HPHA) offers an alternative known as the “Lease-In-Place” (LIP) option. This allows families to apply their voucher to their current rental unit, provided it meets standard quality and rent reasonableness. Because this option eliminates the need to navigate the competitive and often exclusionary search for a new unit, it bypasses many of the hurdles described above. By stabilizing tenancies and securing housing without the need for a new search, LIP serves as an immediate safeguard against losing their subsidies.

Why do landlords participate in the program, and why might they not?

Because the HCV program owns no housing, it depends entirely on the voluntary participation of private landlords. For property owners, the program offers a reliable, government-guaranteed portion of rent that is largely insulated from the tenant’s finances. However, these benefits are often weighed against significant hesitations, including concerns about potential property damage, the administrative burden of paperwork, inspection requirements that can prolong vacancies while awaiting PHA approval, and the widespread perception that voucher holders carry a higher risk profile than market-rate tenants.

Hawai‘i has developed a growing set of programs to address these concerns. Partners in Care has operated a Landlord Engagement Program on O‘ahu that recruits landlords for households experiencing or at risk of homelessness, negotiates screening criteria, and backs participating landlords with a dedicated help line and a damage-mitigation fund. At the state level, HPHA established a landlord incentive program, including signing bonuses of up to one month’s rent for new landlords leasing in high-opportunity or hard-to-lease areas, vacancy-loss payments between voucher tenants, and reimbursement for tenant-caused damage beyond the security deposit.

While incentive programs operate as a “carrot” to foster participation, the state has also introduced a “stick” through Source-of-Income (SOI) legislation. Act 310, effective May of 2023, prohibits landlords owning more than four rental units from refusing an applicant—or advertising a unit as unavailable—solely based on their participation in the HCV program, with a penalty of up to $2,000 for first violation and $2,500 for each subsequent one. However, the ultimate impact of these SOI protections on voucher take-up remains an open question. While the law effectively bans explicit exclusion, it does not mandate acceptance. Reluctant landlords may still find ways to decline applicants on other grounds. In some cases, this may inadvertently complicate the search process for voucher families, as they may now unknowingly direct inquiries toward landlords who remain implicitly unwilling to participate.

State of the Program

One in fifteen renters holds a voucher

In 2024, about 12,000 households in Hawai‘i held a housing voucher of some type. The population makes up about 7% of the state’s roughly 182,000 renter households and about 2% of its total housing stock. Figure 1 decomposes them. 82% of the households receive the core tenant-based vouchers, the focus of this report. These are the ordinary vouchers awarded from the general waiting list and usable with any willing landlord. Another 7% receive project-based vouchers attached to specific buildings, and 11% receive special-purpose vouchers, including vouchers for veterans and people with disabilities, discussed later in the report.

Two decades of a program that barely grew

The program size has grown surprisingly little over the past two decades as shown in Figure 2. From 2003 through 2020, the number of tenant-based voucher households remained stagnant at around 8,000. While there was a substantial climb post-pandemic—an increase of about 1,300 households between 2020 and 2023—this does not reflect a permanent expansion. Much of this growth stemmed from Emergency Housing Vouchers (EHV) created by the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 during COVID. As these temporary allocations are not reissued upon turnover, this capacity is slowly draining away, leaving the program at the same scale it was twenty years ago. This lack of growth is not due to a lack of investment. As shown in the next section, while federal budget allocations have grown steadily, the program remains stuck in terms of the number of households it can actually serve.

Geographically, Honolulu County hosts about 59% of tenant-based vouchers in lease, followed by Hawai‘i County (18%), Maui County (15%), and Kaua‘i (8%). The shares have been broadly stable over time, but that does not mirror the renter population in the state. The City and County of Honolulu is home to 75% of Hawai‘i’s renters, but only 59% of its vouchers. Every neighbor island county holds a larger share of the state’s vouchers than of its renters. Per 100 renters, Kaua‘i has about 10 vouchers, Hawai‘i about 9, Maui about 8, and Honolulu only 4.

More spending per voucher, barely more vouchers

A large and steady stream of federal money flows into Hawai‘i’s rental market to facilitate housing for voucher recipients. In 2024, approximately $170 million in federal rental assistance supported these leases, a three-fold increase since 2003, or roughly 70% after adjusting for inflation. This contrasts sharply with how the program size expanded: the number of voucher households grew by only 20%. This implies that nearly the entire increase in funding was absorbed by rising rents rather than serving additional families. The average subsidy per household has increased from about $560 to $1,400 per month (roughly a 40% increase in real terms). When compared to the national average of $1,100, Hawai‘i buys significantly fewer vouchers per federal dollar.

This fiscal strain is set to intensify as Hawai‘i’s housing market faces compounding affordability pressures. Sharply rising insurance premiums, high HOA fees, and new disaster-risk requirements tied to updated FEMA flood maps are driving up the cost of maintaining rental housing (Tyndall et al., 2026). These rising market costs inevitably absorb a greater share of federal funding, acting as a “rent inflation tax” on the program. As market-side costs continue to escalate, more federal dollars must be diverted just to keep existing tenants housed, creating a structural fiscal strain that makes it increasingly difficult to maintain current program size, let alone expand it to meet the state’s growing need.

Building more housing may ease the fiscal strain

Rising market rents force federal subsidies to cover an ever-increasing portion of each lease. Because the voucher program relies on the private rental market, the most direct way to reduce the per-voucher subsidy burden is a lower market rent. And the most reliable source of lower rents is to increase the overall supply of housing.

This relationship is observable on O‘ahu. Figure 4 compares the median gross rent for new voucher entrants in single-family homes and townhomes (including detached, semi-detached, rowhouse, and townhouse units) against those in apartments (including low-rise and high-rise developments). Before 2021, rents for both housing types moved in parallel and barely moved at all. Since then, however, they have split. The 42% rise of rents for houses and townhomes arrived in the last three years, while rents in multifamily properties climbed modestly at roughly half the pace. This shift coincides with a period during which Honolulu has added substantial multifamily housing supply, including both market-rate developments and income-restricted, affordable units. This suggests that a robust supply of multifamily housing may have played a role in tempering rent growth, and in turn, the government’s subsidy burden.

This supply-side effect could further be amplified by “filtering” (Fang et al., 2026; Mast, 2023). When new housing units enter the market–even luxury or market-rate developments–they initiate a chain of residential moves. As households vacate their previous homes to occupy these new units, those vacated properties become available for others, and the turnover works its way down to the older, more affordable stock that voucher households can actually reach. The filtering evidence implies that expanding the total housing inventory, regardless of unit type or price point, potentially does double duty for HCV: it lowers the rents the program must pay, and it keeps units within reach of the families the program serves.

Some issued vouchers go unused

A voucher issued is not a voucher used. PHAs can lease fewer units than they allocated for two reasons: budgets fall short as the dollars run out before the vouchers get leased up (funding constraint) or families cannot find qualifying units (leasing constraints).

Figure 5 shows a sharp contrast in utilization rates across counties. Hawai‘i and Maui County run their allocations essentially in full. Hawai‘i has operated at 93-100% from 2009, and Maui has held at 98-99% since 2018. Honolulu runs persistently lower at 63-82% with its rate slowly climbing in 2021, possibly with the accompanying pandemic-era EHV allocations.

The starkest case is Kaua‘i, which for a decade leased only about half of its allocated vouchers before climbing to about three-quarters by 2024. This resulted in hundreds of authorized vouchers remaining unused in the state’s smallest rental market. However,  caution is warranted before reading these rates at face value. The number of allocated vouchers in Kaua‘i is roughly double every other county’s relative to the size of its rental market, so its low rate says less about families going unserved than Maui’s near-100% says about a well-matched allocation. Per renter household, Kaua‘i actually leases as many vouchers as any county in the state.

Why would utilization rates differ sharply across islands? First is the budget and rent price issue. With low budget and high rent price, a PHA can exhaust its budget well short of its authorized unit count, and national analyses find agencies typically spend nearly all available funding even when unit counts lag (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2019). Second, a voucher becomes utilized only if a family successfully finds a unit that passes inspection, rents near the ceiling, and has a willing landlord. Thus, vouchers are more difficult to use in markets where vacancies are scarce and rents outrun payment standards (Finkel and Buron, 2001; Ellen et al., 2021). Third, administrative capacity and market thinness could play a role. In a rental market as small as Kaua‘i with roughly 7,400 renter households, a single large landlord’s participation decision or one staff vacancy could substantially move the utilization rate.

Voucher households are Hawai‘i’s poorest renters and they are poorer than twenty years ago

In 2024, the median voucher household lived on about $17,300 a year, about a sixth of the $100,400 median income of all households in the state, as shown in Figure 6. Among all tenant-based voucher households, 78% were classified as “extremely low income,” those earning less than 30% of the AMI, suggesting that HCV is one of the core housing subsidies for the most vulnerable population in the state.

Over time, however, the program increasingly serves people in deeper poverty. As shown in the figure, the median household income of all households in the state grew from about $66,000 in 2010 to $100,000 in 2024, whereas the median among the voucher households only increased from around $13,000 to $17,300. In fact, they have become poorer over time: when adjusted to 2024 dollars, the real median income among voucher recipients decreased from $19,100 to $17,300, a 9% drop, even as the real income of all Hawai‘i households increased, suggesting that the program increasingly serves a population that is falling further behind the households around it.

This trend is likely to put more pressure on the program’s fiscal administration. Because tenants contribute a fixed share of their own income toward rent, stagnant incomes effectively convert every dollar of rent growth into federal subsidy. In real terms, the total program spending has risen roughly 70% since 2003, partly because rents outpaced general inflation, but even more because tenant contributions, which are tied to incomes that failed to keep up, fell about 25% at the median. This leaves little or no room to serve other voucher-eligible households on the waitlist.

Targeted workforce development may promote household independence and reduce fiscal strain

To mitigate the fiscal strain caused by stagnant tenant incomes, the state may consider integrating workforce development and economic mobility programs directly into voucher administration. Currently, the program functions primarily as a housing safety net. By partnering with state workforce development agencies to offer targeted vocational training, financial literacy, or educational assistance to non-elderly, non-disabled recipients, the state could create viable pathways for increased earnings. These programs would empower households to incrementally increase their rent contributions, thereby reducing their reliance on federal subsidies and increasing program turnover—effectively graduating more families to independent housing while creating capacity for those on the waiting list. Such programs are especially important because housing assistance, on its own, measurably discourages work (Jacob and Ludwig, 2012).

However, simply providing training may be insufficient due to the “benefits cliff.” Housing assistance can inadvertently discourage labor force participation; because tenants pay roughly 30% of their income toward rent, every additional dollar earned increases their rent contribution by 30 cents. In practice, the disincentive may be even larger than the voucher’s own because voucher households often receive SNAP, Medicaid, or childcare subsidies that also may phase out as earnings rise. Stacked together, these phase-outs can claim most of each additional dollar earned, so that a promotion or a move to full-time work can leave a family financially worse off.

To counter these barriers, workforce development should be paired with structural incentives. One such approach is HUD’s Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) program, which allows participants to sign a five-year contract with their housing authority. When increased earnings lead to a higher rent share, the “excess” rent is directed into a savings account rather than being lost to rent hikes. Upon successful completion of the contract—employed and off welfare—the family retains these savings. By decoupling work from immediate rent increases, this approach transforms labor participation from a financial penalty into a vehicle for building assets. While HUD’s long-term evaluation reveals mixed results regarding overall earnings gains, the program has delivered substantial financial benefits to successful graduates and highly educated subgroups (Freedman et al., 2023). Consequently, enrollment should be prioritized for households with working-age earners. This approach is particularly promising for Hawai‘i, where the high prevalence of multigenerational families means that many households with elderly or disabled members still include working-age adults. By specifically targeting these households, the state can concentrate resources where they are most likely to yield results.

Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Voucher Recipients

The efficacy of the Housing Choice Voucher program is inextricably linked to the demographics of its recipients. As outlined in the previous section, the program faces significant fiscal pressures where rising rents absorb the majority of federal funding. These pressures are further compounded by two defining demographic trends: the deepening poverty of voucher households (as described above) and an aging population. Because tenant contributions are tied to their income, stagnant income means that every dollar of rent inflation must be covered by a federal subsidy, limiting the program’s ability to serve more families.

Voucher population is aging in place, and new entrants arrive older

One of the most significant changes to HCV in over the course of two decades is who the program serves. Figure 7 shows household composition over time. The share of families with children fell from 61% in 2003 to 44% in 2024, while the share with an elderly member more than doubled from 17% to 38%.

This change in the demographic composition reflects the aging population of the state itself where the share of residents 65 and older rose from 15% in 2014 to 21% by 2024. However, demography alone understates the program’s increasing lease-up by elderly members. HCV’s population is aging roughly twice as fast as the state: from 2014 to 2024, the elderly voucher households’ share increased by 13 percentage points, and Figure 8 decomposes why into two channels. Among households assisted in both 2014 and 2024, the share with an elderly member more than doubled from 23% to 48% – the same families, just ten years older. At the same time, the entry mix itself has aged as well. About 13% of households admitted in 2014 had an elderly member, against 24% of those admitted in 2024.

The aging of the voucher population carries significant fiscal and programmatic implications. As these households age, they participate less in the labor market, making it increasingly difficult for them to exit the program. This trend naturally tightens turnover which is the primary engine that provides new vouchers for families on the waitlist. From a long-term stability standpoint, this suggests that the voucher program is increasingly functioning as a permanent safety net for Hawai‘i’s elderly population. While this provides essential housing security, the resulting low turnover further constrains the program’s capacity to assist new families, highlighting a growing tension between serving current, long-term participants and expanding access to new households.

HCV increasingly serves more Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander families

The HCV program in Hawai‘i has evolved into one of the vital pillars of housing assistance for the Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander (NHPI) families. As of 2024, NHPI individuals comprise the largest group of assisted people at 37%, which grew steadily over time from 24% in 2003. When individuals of mixed NHPI ancestry are accounted for, this number increases significantly, highlighting the voucher’s role as a cornerstone of housing stability for these families.

This demographic shift likely reflects the intersection of specific household needs and housing market constraints. As I document later in Table 2, NHPI-headed households are more likely to support larger, child-rearing families and have lower per-member income. In a rental market characterized by a scarcity of large, affordable units, these families encounter profound barriers to entry. The voucher program provides the necessary leverage to overcome these, serving as a critical safeguard against housing instability.

Wages are the primary income source, yet pensions are catching up

The stereotype of subsidized households is that they are too dependent on non-labor income sources. However, the left panel of Figure 10 depicts that among the total income earned by voucher households in Hawai‘i, 57% of them came from wages and self-employment in 2024. There was a temporary drop during COVID in wage income, replaced by unemployment insurance, but the level is now back up. Income from welfare, including temporary assistance for needy families (TANF) and general assistance (GA), supply under 3%, down from roughly a fifth of all income in the 2000s. In addition, there is a gradual increase in social security income as the overall voucher population ages as shown above.

While wage income remains the largest source of total earnings, the proportion of households relying on pensions as their primary income source has increased steadily from 35% to 47%. This shift is a natural outcome of the aging population documented above. From a fiscal perspective, this creates further inefficiency and strain as tenant contributions rise only when incomes rise, and pension incomes typically do not.

Families with children face the deepest poverty, while elderly households rely on stable pension income

Table 2 shows the characteristics of voucher households by presence of children, by presence of an elderly or disabled member, and by the head’s race/ethnicity. It reveals a stark difference in voucher household composition: families with children and elderly households represent two distinct economic characteristics. Families with children are younger, larger, and more often female-headed, with 40% identifying as NHPI. While these households appear to have higher total incomes at around $30,000, their larger average household size results in the lowest per-member income of any group, suggesting that they are the most economically vulnerable.

Table 2. Characteristics of voucher households by household type and head’s race and ethnicity, 2024

In contrast, households with an elderly member are smaller and older and rely heavily on fixed pension income. Consequently, while they have lower household income, their higher per-member income provides a level of financial stability not seen in child-rearing families. This divergence is also reflected by race. NHPI-headed households, which skew younger and support larger families, bear the brunt of this per-member poverty, whereas White- and Asian-headed households skew older and smaller, experiencing higher economic security.

Vouchers, Housing Affordability, and Program Costs

Voucher subsidies significantly reduce rent burden, though one-in-three households remain cost-burdened

The program’s core is to provide housing stability while freeing the voucher households from extreme financial hardship by requiring every household to contribute approximately 30% of its adjusted income toward rent (i.e., not cost-burdened). In theory, this design should eliminate the rent burden for all participants. However, in practice, this mechanism encounters significant friction within Hawai‘i’s exceptionally tight rental market. Assisted families may still face costs exceeding the 30% threshold for two primary reasons. Some families choose to stretch beyond the payment standard to secure better-located units or larger homes, while others are pushed to being cost-burdened when local rents outpace payment standards, leaving few viable options below the ceiling.

In 2024, while 67% of voucher households successfully achieved the program’s goal of paying less than 30% of their income toward housing, a significant 33% remained rent-burdened despite receiving the subsidy. Specifically, 24% of participants paid between 30% and 50% of their income out of pocket, and 9% were severely burdened, paying more than half of their total income toward rent. This persistent burden underscores the challenges of achieving full affordability in a high-cost environment.

Though 33% of the households are rent-burdened even with the housing subsidy, it is much less when compared to the overall renter population in the state. Only a third of voucher households are burdened against more than half of all Hawai‘i renters. Considering only the severely burdened category, that number is 9% versus 29%. The voucher does not abolish rent burden altogether, but it does make housing more affordable for these low-income households.

Rent ceiling kept up with the housing market

A common criticism of HCV is that its rent ceilings often lag behind real-time local market rents. This is because HUD’s Fair Market Rents (FMRs) are typically calculated using trailing Census data, creating a multi-year gap that can lead to search and utilization failures in fast-moving markets. While HUD applies lag adjustments to these estimates to better approximate current values, these corrections may fall short when local markets accelerate unexpectedly. For instance, FY2026 FMRs are based on Census estimates in 2023. If payment standards do not accurately reflect current market conditions, families find it nearly impossible to lease decent units, effectively decreasing the value of the voucher.

However, Hawai‘i’s data reveals a notable local administrative success. While all PHAs have the regulatory flexibility to set payment standards between 90% and 110% of FMR, the data suggest that Hawai‘i’s local agencies have proactively and consistently utilized the upper end of this range. By doing so, local agencies have ensured that rent ceilings closely track actual market rates.

Hawai‘i’s data actually shows that the criticism does not apply here, and Figure 12 shows it. The left panel shows that the payment standards–the ceilings PHAs actually apply based on HUD’s recommended FMR–tracked the market rate closely over the past two decades. Since 2022, the payment standards now run above it. In 2024, the median payment standard on voucher leases was about $2,120 against a statewide market median of around $1,970, meaning that voucher households are able to lease units more comfortably as there are more rental supplies available that meet the rent ceilings. The same pattern holds when the scope is restricted to only the two-bedroom units alone–the single most common voucher unit size at about one lease in three (right panel). 

PHAs are typically given autonomy to set payment standards between 90% and 110% of FMR with a bit more wiggle room when approved by HUD, and it shows that Hawai‘i’s PHAs used that room. The local agencies, which know much more about the local housing market, kept the ceiling to reflect the true market rent without any lags.

Stagnant tenant incomes make every rent dollar a federal dollar

The program’s cost has two moving parts: what the unit rents for, and what the tenant can contribute. Rents did what Hawai‘i rents do as shown in Figure 13: the median gross rent on voucher-leased units roughly doubled over the past two decades. Tenant contributions, fixed at about 30% of income, can grow only if incomes grow, and as shown earlier, incomes remained stagnant, and so tenant payment remained flat as well. Essentially, all rent growth was passed through to the federal subsidy, with the median reaching $1,317.

Neighborhoods and Spatial Patterns of Voucher Households

Voucher households live in neighborhoods similar to poor renters, but noticeably better than public housing tenants

Do vouchers allow households to rent in observably higher-resourced neighborhoods? Table 3 shows the average characteristics of neighborhoods of four comparable populations: tenant-based voucher households, public housing households, poor renters (those living under the Federal Poverty Line), and all renters.

Table 3. Average neighborhood characteristics of voucher households and other comparable groups, 2024

Voucher families live in neighborhoods that are similar to those of the state’s poor renters, but they tend to live in neighborhoods with somewhat lower poverty rates (14% vs 18%). This represents about a half standard deviation lower neighborhood poverty rate, suggesting that voucher households are less likely to live in neighborhoods with a high concentration of poverty. The contrast is stark when comparing these figures to public housing residents, who reside in neighborhoods with poverty levels nearly twice as high as those of voucher holders. This indicates that voucher households are associated with lower exposure to concentrated poverty. This is likely supported by the flexibility of location choice that vouchers offer.

Voucher households concentrate in specific neighborhoods

Figure 14 maps the number of voucher households present in each ZIP code in 2024. On every island, the households tend to concentrate in a handful of neighborhoods. On O‘ahu, the largest are Wai‘anae and ‘Ewa Beach neighborhoods with about 800 and 700 voucher families, respectively. In Hawai‘i County, it is Hilo with over 700 households. On Maui, the centers are Wailuku and Kahului, and Līhu‘e on Kaua‘i.

There are several intersecting reasons why such spatial patterns of voucher households emerge. One is self-sorting: households often choose neighborhoods based on social ties, preferring to live near family and friends—who often share similar economic circumstances—or in areas with shared racial and cultural backgrounds. However, structural constraints are equally significant. The availability of affordable rental stock is the most obvious barrier; voucher households often face extreme difficulty in owner-occupant dominant neighborhoods where rental options are scarce, or in areas where high rental prices exceed payment standards, such as Salt Lake or ‘Aiea. Beyond supply and price, spatial clustering is also driven by practical accessibility. Households often favor areas with better proximity to public transit and essential services to minimize daily costs. Additionally, the ‘network effect’ plays a role, as information about voucher-friendly landlords often circulates within specific social circles, and clusters naturally form around properties where management has an established history of accepting vouchers. If policy aims at upward mobility as well as housing stability, facilitating access to affordable rental stocks in a broader range of neighborhoods remains critical.

One policy already pushes in this direction. Since 2018, HUD has required Urban Honolulu–one of 24 metropolitan areas selected nationally–to set its voucher rent ceilings ZIP code by ZIP code under Small Area Fair Market Rents (SAFMR), rather than applying a single metro-wide ceiling. By raising the subsidy ceiling in expensive neighborhoods and lowering it in inexpensive ones, the policy is designed to make units in higher-opportunity neighborhoods financially reachable for voucher families. Previous research has found that it modestly shifts families toward lower-poverty neighborhoods (Dastrup et al., 2019; Collinson and Ganong, 2018; Ellen et al., 2025a).

Neighborhood characteristics remain remarkably consistent across different family and racial demographics

The neighborhood outcomes for Hawai‘i’s voucher recipients are notably equal across different groups. In New York City, for example, voucher families with children reside in neighborhoods with significantly higher poverty rates and lower economic resources than their counterparts without children, as estimated by New York University’s Furman Center. As shown in Table 4, voucher households with children in Hawai‘i live in neighborhoods with identical poverty rates to those without children. In fact, families with children tend to locate in neighborhoods with higher median incomes and slightly higher median gross rents. This consistency persists across racial and ethnic lines as well.

Table 4. Average neighborhood characteristics of voucher households by household type and head’s race and ethnicity, 2024

Wait, Entry, Tenure, and Program Exit

Time on the waitlist is falling, but getting on the list is the hard part

Using data on the waiting-list entry date recorded at each admission, Figure 15 tracks the average wait, in months, among newly admitted families by admission year, and the shape is an inverted U. Families admitted in the mid-2000s had waited two to four years on average. The cohort admitted in 2014 waited the longest, averaging around seven and a half years. Wait times have since fallen to about 13 to 19 months for the families admitted between 2022 and 2024, which is much faster than the historical average of 40 months.

However, these figures should be interpreted as an extreme lower bound on true wait times, as the clock begins only once a family successfully joins a waiting list. In Hawai‘i, getting onto the list is itself a significant hurdle. For instance, the City and County of Honolulu accepted applications for just five days in 2023, receiving over 11,000 applications but selecting only 3,000 via lottery (Hawaii News Now). Its next opening did not occur until nearly two and a half years later (Aloha State Daily). Similarly, Maui’s list opened for four days in 2023 and has remained closed since (Maui County). The HPHA, the state’s largest agency, kept its waiting list closed for ten years before reopening in 2016 (Civil Beat), with the subsequent opening arriving four years later (Civil Beat).

Such backlogs likely influence not only how long families wait but also who is ultimately served. Lists that open for brief windows every few years reward households that are attentive, well-informed, or well-connected enough to apply during that narrow timeframe. These short windows may prioritize families who can proactively monitor announcements, potentially being disadvantageous to those in crisis who are least able to do so. While the data constraints prevent a definitive analysis of this selection bias, it is clear that voucher recipients are not a random sample of the eligible population. The wait times documented here reflect only the experience of families who successfully navigated the process—after potentially waiting several years just to gain a spot on the list.

More households are entering the program homeless

In the mid-2000s, about one newly admitted household in twenty was homeless at admission. In the 2020s, that number has grown significantly to roughly one in five, showing the growing homelessness problem in the state spilling over into housing assistance programs. Hawai‘i’s ordinary voucher program has become an increasingly important exit pathway from homelessness, putting more strain on the already-stretched system.

Low program turnover means most families remain in the program for several years

As shown in Figure 17, an average of approximately 900 households have entered and exited the voucher program annually over the past two decades, suggesting that the program recycles rather than accumulates.

Of 100 families admitted, how many are still assisted after each year? Figure 18 shows the “survival” curve, showing how many of the families of the 100 are still in the voucher program (or “survive” in the program) at the start of each year of tenure. About 10 in 100 exit during each of the first two years, and about 7 or 8 every year thereafter. Half of admitted families are still assisted seven years later, and about a quarter after fourteen. When I only consider formally recorded, half of the families exit after 9.5 years.

While the data do not record why households leave the program, following each exiting household from program entry to exit reveals that exits take many forms. Table 5 groups households whose participation formally ended in 2023 or 2024 by how their real income changed over their tenure in the program.

Economic progress among leavers is concentrated in one distinct group. About 40% of exiting households left after experiencing substantial real income growth. Their average real income (in 2024 dollars) more than doubled over their stay, and they are predominantly younger, working families with children. Such exits are consistent with transitions toward housing independence. The remaining exits, however, exhibit different characteristics. Approximately 30% were short-tenure spells, two-thirds of which entered the program during the pandemic beginning in 2021 and left with low, unchanged incomes. This suggests brief assistance episodes such as EHVs. The final 30% consist of long-tenure households whose real incomes fell substantially before leaving, suggesting departures driven by reasons other than economic success. While it is difficult to isolate the contribution of the HCV program to economic mobility, this pattern demonstrates that economic “graduation” is a viable pathway out of the program for a significant share of participants.

Table 5. Households exiting the voucher program in 2023-2024, grouped by real income change between entry and exit

Two Subsidies, One Building

The Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program operates alongside supply-side initiatives—such as the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), the City and County of Honolulu’s Bill 7, and the state’s Rental Housing Revolving Fund—designed to subsidize the development of affordable rental units. Because HCVs are not restricted to market-rate properties, they can be utilized in buildings that have already received public subsidies. This intersection raises a central policy question: is the combination of tenant-based vouchers and subsidized supply a redundancy, or does it provide essential complementarity? The concern is that if voucher holders occupy units that could otherwise serve low-income households without additional rental assistance, the program may effectively ‘double-subsidize’ these units while leaving other eligible families unassisted.

At least one in four voucher households on O‘ahu reside in subsidized properties

To assess the extent of overlapping subsidies, I analyzed the intersection of tenant-based voucher households and publicly subsidized housing developments on O‘ahu. Using property-level data from UHERO’s Subsidized Housing Explorer, I matched assisted households to these developments by address.

In 2024, out of approximately 6,700 voucher households on O‘ahu (including both regular tenant-based vouchers and the special-purpose vouchers, which I discuss in the next section), roughly 24% resided in subsidized properties, while 58% lived in market-rate housing. For the remaining 18%, address data was insufficient for matching. These findings indicate that at least one in four voucher families on O‘ahu are utilizing their assistance in properties previously developed through public subsidy programs.

Subsidized properties serve a more vulnerable voucher population

Does the presence of voucher holders in subsidized properties represent an inefficient use of scarce housing resources—essentially ‘double-subsidizing’ units that could otherwise house other low-income families? While this appears to be the case on the surface, a closer examination of household demographics reveals a different reality.

Table 6 shows the characteristics of voucher households in subsidized properties and market-rate buildings. Voucher households in subsidized properties are, on average, smaller, older, more likely to have a disabled member, and less likely to participate in the labor market. While part of this pattern is likely driven by some stocks being age-restricted senior housing, these characteristics also suggest that these households face significant barriers in the private rental market. Private landlords may favor working tenants who are perceived as more likely to reliably pay their portion of the rent, creating a screening effect that excludes more vulnerable populations.

Table 6. Characteristics of voucher households in subsidized and market-rate properties on O‘ahu

Consequently, rather than representing simple waste, subsidized properties often serve as a complementary policy tool. They provide a critical, accessible housing stock for vulnerable voucher holders who might otherwise fail to lease a unit in the private market resulting in lost vouchers and further housing instability. Rather than serving as a duplication of subsidies, this overlap appears to function as a vital safety net.

However, this finding also highlights the need for policy interventions aimed at recruiting more private landlords of non-subsidized properties. Increasing voucher acceptance among private landlords could reduce the need to double-subsidize the vulnerable households on subsidized developments, thereby freeing up those units for low-income families who are ineligible for vouchers or remain on waiting lists.

Beyond Tenant-Based Vouchers

The tenant-based voucher program that I have discussed thus far is the largest of the Housing Choice Voucher program, but not the only branch of the voucher family. In 2024, there were about 2,200 additional households in Hawai‘i who were assisted through other targeted vouchers. Figure 20 shows those branches. The programs mainly differ in what the subsidy attaches to, whom it is reserved for, and how long it lasts. I describe each in turn in this section.

Project-based vouchers

A project-based voucher attaches the subsidy to the unit rather than to the family, so the assistance stays with the housing unit even if the household leaves. A PHA may commit at most 20% of its authorized voucher units to projects, with a further 10% permitted for units housing homeless families or veterans, or that provide supportive housing to elderly people or people with disabilities. A family living in a unit with a project-based voucher is not locked in. After one year of project-based assistance, it may terminate the lease and take a tenant-based voucher instead, and if none is immediately available, the PHA must give the family priority for the next one. A family that leaves before the year is up forfeits that right.

HUD-VASH

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (VASH) program pairs an ordinary tenant-based voucher with case management and clinical services supplied by the Department of Veterans Affairs, delivered at VA medical centers, community-based outpatient clinics, or through VA-designated entities. Veterans reach the program through the VA rather than through a standard voucher waiting list.

Disability-targeted vouchers

There are broadly two streams of disability-based vouchers reserved for non-elderly people with disabilities. Mainstream vouchers go to households that include a person with disabilities who is at least 18 years old and not yet 62 years old when the assistance begins. Mainstream vouchers run under standard voucher rules with a separate appropriation, and a family does not lose eligibility by aging past 62 once admitted. Non-elderly disabled vouchers apply a narrower test: a head, co-head, or spouse who is under age 62 with a disability, whereas Mainstream requires only that some household members qualify. Some of the allocations for non-elderly disabled vouchers are directed at people moving out of nursing homes and other health-care institutions into the community, which makes the program an instrument of deinstitutionalization as much as of housing assistance.

Emergency Housing Vouchers (EHV)

EHV, part of the standard tenant-based voucher program, was created by the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021. About 70,000 vouchers were allocated outside the usual admission process and filled by referral from homeless response systems during COVID. About 700 of those came to Hawai‘i. The program is now closing: vouchers turning over after September 30, 2023 are not reissued.

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